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1 Introduction 
Key current policy strategies include commitments to act on a path to long-term goals, such 
as the large-scale reduction of CO2 emissions to stabilize the earth’s temperature or a reduction 
of a growing public debt burden to a sustainable level. Whether or not these goals are achieved 
depends on the credibility of the government’s commitment and the persistence in its actions. The 
temptation of a government to deviate from its previously determined optimal policy path was 
recognized in the seminal work by Kydland and Prescott (1977). In democracies, however, the 
identity of the incumbent government may change regularly and the achievement of long-term 
objectives thus rests on the persistence of policies across electoral cycles, complicating matters 
further. Some have even argued that election cycles may be a significant obstacle to achieving 
long-term policy goals (Nordhaus 1975). Tabellini and Alesina (1990) show theoretically that 
voter disagreement about the composition of government spending translates into excessive def-
icits when government majorities change over time. Such a deficit bias occurs even though all 
voters prefer behind the veil of ignorance a balanced budget.  
Typically, incumbent policy makers differ in their views from members of the opposition, and 
this includes differences in expectations over the likelihood of reaching a goal with certain policy 
actions and the credibility of the objective itself. Expectations are crucial in determining whether 
decision makers from various political factions stick to a common policy across time. So far, little 
is known about what determines these expectations – whether or not they are persistent over time, 
and how they are affected by exogenous factors such as the economic environment. In the present 
paper, we shed light on these issues using unique panel data from a survey among German state 
parliamentarians about the credibility of a fiscal rule, whose purpose is to stabilize the public debt 
level. In our analysis, we investigate whether differences in compliance expectations are either 
the result of the dissimilar perspectives from the government and opposition benches or simply 
mirror a partisan effect.  
In prior research, partisanship has been shown to be an important driver of expectations about 
future fiscal performance (Tavares 2004; Tilley and Hobolt 2011). If partisan biases in expecta-
tions persist also after changes of government, they may lead to instable policy paths and the 
failure to achieve future policy goals. In addition, prior research has shown that uncertainty about 
fiscal policy due to partisan conflict or varying expectations has significant implications for real 
economic outcomes (Azzimonti 2018; Bi et al. 2013; Backus and Driffill 1985). Our interest thus 
lies in understanding the link between partisan perspectives, incumbency, expectations in fiscal 
rule compliance, and actual economic outcomes. To make progress to this end, we aim to answer 
the following two questions: 
(1) Do politicians’ expectations about future compliance with a fiscal rule depend on their role 
in parliament (opposition vs. incumbent government) or do these expectations rather reflect a 
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stable partisan pattern independent from a party’s role in government or opposition? 
(2) How do politicians adjust their expectations when new information on the fiscal environ-
ment becomes available? 
In a nutshell, we find a strong incumbency effect that is distinct from a party effect. Members 
of government coalition parties are much more optimistic about the compliance of their state with 
the fiscal rule than members of the opposition. Past improvements in fiscal fundamentals have 
relatively little effect on the expectations of politicians, yet an unexpected negative fiscal shock 
makes opposition members more pessimistic, while not affecting members of the governing coa-
lition. As the positive incumbency effect reverts the previously pessimistic expectations of oppo-
sition politicians once they enter office, our findings imply that long-term policy goals can be 
achieved despite political turnover, as long as there is some basic agreement about the desirability 
of the goal among politicians. 
Our interest in fiscal rules is motivated by the marked increase in the number of numerical 
fiscal rules designed to constrain government deficits and debt levels (Lledo et al. 2017; Yared 
2019). The wave of new rules peaked in the years following the economic and financial crisis of 
2008-9 (Schaechter et al. 2012). Germany introduced a new fiscal rule, the so-called “debt brake” 
(Schuldenbremse) into its constitution in the year 2009. Similar to other fiscal rules, like the Sta-
bility and Growth Pact or the Maastricht Treaty of the European Union, the German debt brake 
follows a ‘lagged implementation’ schedule (Buchanan 1994). The debt brake was phased in over 
several years, and the fiscal target of a structurally balanced budget has become binding for the 
sub-national states (Länder) only in 2020, more than ten years later.  
We analyze compliance expectations of the individual members of the German state parlia-
ments who vote on state budget laws and thus the path to compliance with the debt brake. We 
benefit from a unique database, a customized survey among all 16 German state parliaments, 
which we conducted in two waves. The first wave took place in 2011-2012, the second about four 
years later in 2014-2016. In the survey, we ask members of parliaments about the likelihood of 
compliance with the debt brake in their own state from 2020 onwards.  
The design of the survey and its panel structure with a considerable overlap of individual re-
spondents in both waves allow us to identify the effect of government incumbency and changes 
in the fiscal environment.1 In a separate probit analysis for the response probability of all parlia-
 
                                                         
 
1 In Heinemann et al. (2016) only the first wave results were used to study compliance expectations in a cross-sections. 
We discuss differences to this work in Section 4 in more detail. 
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mentarians, we find that the regression results are unlikely to be biased by selection due to con-
ditional unit non-response. As for incumbency, we exploit eight switches in the composition of 
state governments between the two survey waves that changed the role of some parliamentarians 
from opposition to being part of the governing coalition, and for others in the opposite direction. 
The debt brake was not a key item in any election campaign and the change in political majorities 
is therefore likely to be exogenous with respect to the expectations of policymakers. In our anal-
ysis, we control for a further partisan effect by using party dummies. We thereby consider changes 
in the political environment, such as the entry of the newly founded right wing populist party 
Alternative for Germany (AfD), which like other populist movements in Europe has a particular 
critical view on the traditional parties and their policy performance, including a more pessimistic 
compliance expectation. 
We use an unexpected event to study the role of fiscal fundamentals on expectations in fiscal 
rule compliance. In 2015, almost 1 million refugees arrived in Germany. The magnitude was 
largely unexpected and was at the time considered a significant negative fiscal shock with esti-
mated additional government spending of 0.5% of GDP in the following year (Independent Ad-
visory Board of the Stability Council 2015). We exploit the fact that during the second survey 
wave by chance some states were surveyed before the peak of the inflow and some after. We 
compare the expectations of politicians surveyed later with those earlier, and study whether dif-
ferences depend on being a member of the governing coalition.  
The key findings of our empirical analysis are as follows: First, the incumbency effect is 
strongly positive. Looking at the full sample that includes both waves, members of incumbent 
government parties are significantly more optimistic than members from opposition parties by at 
least 1.4 points (the answer scale ranges from -4 to +4). This average effect is the result of an 
increasing incumbency effect over time: the effect in wave 2 is about three times as large as the 
one in wave 1. We demonstrate this finding by comparing sets of politicians who have the same 
role in wave 1 (being both in government or both in opposition) but different roles in wave 2. 
There is no comparable effect when the two sets of politicians have a common role in wave 2, 
and a different one in wave 1.  
A plausible explanation is that the gap to the time when the German debt brake becomes bind-
ing (2020) is much closer in the second wave than in the first one. The politicians who are part of 
the government supporting coalition during wave 2 have a reasonable chance of maintaining that 
position in 2020 and the power to affect through fiscal decisions the likelihood of compliance or 
non-compliance with the fiscal rule. Hence, for government politicians, compliance expectations 
in wave 2 already may refer to their own individual future policy performance. By contrast, in 
2011/12 the showdown in 2020 was several election cycles away.  
It is tempting to extrapolate this finding and expect a monotonically increasing incumbency 
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effect as the target year approaches. At the same time, however, the scope to make policy adjust-
ment for reaching a target becomes smaller, and the goal may be considered unreachable at some 
point. For example, a state with a very high budget deficit in 2019 is unlikely to meet a balanced 
budget in 2020. Vice versa, with an improving budgetary situation as it was the case in 2019, 
compliance with the debt brake in 2020 had become highly realistic, also from the perspective of 
the opposition. Reality therefore is likely to constrain expectations of politicians eventually, re-
gardless of their role in government or opposition.  
Second, fiscal fundamentals - such as budgetary balance, level and change of government debt 
- have little relevance on average. These indicators improved considerably between the two waves 
due to accelerating economic growth, lower interest rates and rising tax revenues. Somewhat sur-
prisingly, we do not observe significantly more optimism in compliance expectations over time 
and instead overall expectations are fairly pessimistic. Yet, there is some heterogeneity in the 
effect of fiscal variables on a parliamentarian’s expectation with respect to his or her incumbency. 
For example, members of the incumbent government coalition become more optimistic when the 
budget balance improves, while opposition members show no similar improvement.  
Third, an unexpected change in fiscal conditions matters. We find that politicians were signif-
icantly more pessimistic when surveyed after the peak of the refugee inflow in 2015, at least by 
close to 1 point. The effect appears to be mainly driven by members of opposition parties, not by 
incumbents.  
Fourth, partisan effects as such are generally weak compared to the opposition-government 
cleavage. There might be one exception however: Representatives from the right-wing populist 
AfD have a particular pessimistic expectation that German states could balance their budgets – 
also relative to other opposition parliamentarians. Since we only have data on AfD parliamentar-
ians from the second wave, further research is needed to establish this observation more firmly.   
Taken together, our results suggests that reaching long-term policy goals is not bound to fail 
even though political majorities and fiscal conditions change. Members of opposition parties be-
come more optimistic once they enter the governing coalition, increasing the credibility and per-
ceived achievability of the long-term policy goal, which make it more likely that the new govern-
ment will continue to pursue the initial policy path.  
Our paper contributes to the literature on fiscal rules. Yared (2019) surveys the literature and 
makes the case for the role of political economy aspects in explaining rising debt levels and the 
widespread introduction of fiscal rules. Caselli et al. (2018) discusses practical issues in the use 
and design of fiscal rules. There is a large and growing literature that assesses the effectiveness 
of fiscal rules on fiscal outcomes. A common approach is to estimate in cross-section or panel 
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models the effect of fiscal rules on outcomes in jurisdictions.2 Recent evidence based on long run 
historical constitions by Asatryan et al. (2018) point to the positive impact of balanced budget 
rules on fiscal outcomes. A further strand of the literature looks into reputation effects of fiscal 
rules on risk spreads (Feld et al. 2017; Heinemann et al. 2014; Iara and Wolff 2014). A common 
feature of all these studies is the unit of observation, which is the (local, regional or national) 
jurisdiction. This kind of research design cannot reveal how a fiscal rule affects expectations of 
individual policy makers within a jurisdiction. Our approach fills this gap and demonstrates the 
heterogeneity of individual compliance expectations both in the cross-section and over time.   
 We relate to work on partisanship and expectation formation. Bisgaard (2015) finds that in 
the UK partisanship does not influence the assessment of the economic situation, but who is to be 
blamed for bad conditions. Gerber et al. (2010) show that political partisanship has a causal effect 
on attitudes and behavior of voters in Connecticut. Easaw (2010) concludes that negative news 
about the economy persists when households assess the perceived competence of the incumbent 
government, whereas good news does not persist. While these works are related, our focus is on 
the expectations of politicians rather than voters, and we are interested in incumbency rather than 
partisanship in form of party membership. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we provide detailed infor-
mation about the survey design and look at the descriptive evidence for compliance expectations. 
In Section 3, we consider the changes in the economic, fiscal and political environment. The 
econometric approach is described in Section 4 followed by the results Section 5. Section 0 con-
cludes. 
2 Survey details and compliance expectations  
2.1 Survey description 
We sent out questionnaires to all members of the 16 German state parliaments in both survey 
waves of 2011/12 and 2014/16. The parliament-specific timing was chosen to contact each par-
liamentarian approximately at mid-term of his or her state-specific election cycle (election dates 
vary across German states) in order to avoid possible low turn-out in times of election campaigns 
or the start of a newly elected parliament when parliamentary newcomers may not be familiar 
with the issue. As a result, parliamentarians were surveyed between March 2011 and May 2012 
in the first wave and between December 2014 and April 2016 in the second wave. The first contact 
 
                                                         
 
2 See for OECD countries Dahan and Strawczynski (2013); for European countries Debrun et al. (Debrun et al. 2008); 
for the Swiss cantons Krogstrup and Wälti (2008); for the U.S. states Poterba (1996). A meta-regression analysis is 
provided by Heinemann et al. (2018). 
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was by regular post, followed by electronic mail reminders and phone calls. Through this proce-
dure, we received 1,302 responses (635 and 667 in wave 1 and 2, respectively). Response rates 
differ across states (see Table 1) but remain stable over time with similar overall response rates 
in both waves (34.1% in the first and 36.8% in the second), which are in the upper range of par-
liamentary survey studies  (for regional parliaments see André, Bradbury, et al. 2015; for national 
parliaments see André, Depauw, et al. 2015). 
All surveys were strictly confidential but non-anonymous in order to match the survey re-
sponses with state characteristics on the one hand and with personal characteristics of parliamen-
tarians such as age and committee membership on the other hand, which are available from public 
sources. In principle, non-anonymity of responses could lead to biased answers as parliamentari-
ans might be concerned about the perceived loyalty to their state or party. In addition, stated 
expectations could be the result of fiscal preferences, which could lead to a self-serving bias. 
However, our survey design and the empirical methodology substantially reduce the potential 
biases. In particular, we guarantee confidential treatment of individual responses to parliamentar-
ians. This provides assurance to survey participants that their individual answers do not become 
public. In this regard, our confidential survey approach is superior to studies that exploit public 
parliamentary roll-call votes and thus cannot capture personal expectations. Moreover, in our 
econometric analysis we control for individual characteristics that might influence the incentive 
to hide true expectations such as membership in a budgetary committee. In addition, we undertake 
a unit non-response analysis to check whether politicians with a certain characteristic are more or 
less likely to participate in the survey (described in more detail below, see also Appendix B).  
2.2 Compliance expectations: levels and changes over time 
Our survey relates to compliance with the German debt brake, which entered the constitution 
in 2009. This set of rules contains provisions for reaching a structurally balanced budget by 2016 
for the federal government and by 2020 for each of the sixteen states (Länder). Unlike the federal 
level, there was no collectively agreed adjustment path set for the states for reaching a balanced 
budget in 2020. The long gap between the entry of the constitutional provision in 2009 and the 
effectiveness of the provision in 2020 was part of a political compromise to get all states to agree 
with the tightening of fiscal rules. The gap makes our analysis interesting because it allows us to 
isolate expectations from effective constraints faced by politicians: Policymakers assess a fiscal 
rule that is not yet binding and thus does not legally constrain concurrent fiscal policy making.  
Compliance expectations are covered through the following survey question: 
In your view, how likely is it that your state will comply with the requirements of the constitutional 
debt brake and have a balanced budget (cyclically adjusted) from 2020 onwards? 
An answer was requested on a nine-point scale from (-4) “impossible” to (+4) “certain”. 
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Figure 1 summarizes average assessments in both waves. Compliance expectations are similar 
in both waves and overall not very optimistic. Only in three states (Bavaria, Mecklenburg-West-
ern Pomerania, Saxony), did parliamentarians assign an average score of about two or higher to 
the likelihood of their state’s compliance in both waves. Over time, mean scores have declined 
for the majority of states (9 out of 16). 
While fairly pessimistic expectations may be not too surprising for the first wave given the 
aftermath of the economic and financial crisis of 2008, the stability of expectations and pessimism 
shown in the second wave appears surprising given the substantial improvement of economic 
fundamentals between the two waves. We will assess the change in the fiscal and political envi-
ronment that occurred between both survey waves in the next section. 
Figure 1: Compliance expectations for own state 
 
3 Fiscal and political environment 
3.1 Political power and changes in parliamentary composition 
Table 1 states the incumbent coalition parties for each survey wave. The parties in our survey 
are: the Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU), a center-right party, the Free Democrats (FDP), a mar-
ket-liberal party, the Social Democrats (SPD), a center-left party, the Green Party (Green), a cen-
ter-left party, the Left Party , a left-wing socialist party, the Alternative for Deutschland (AfD), a 
right-populist party, the Süd-Schleswigsche Wählerverband (SSW), a Danish minority party in 
Schleswig-Holstein, and the Piraten (Pirates), a liberal left-of-center party.  
-3
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1st Survey (2011-12) 2nd Survey (2014-16)
Notes: This figure depicts the average of answers to the survey question about compliance expectations („In your view, how
likely is it that your state will comply with the constitutional debt brake and will present a balanced budget (cyclically adjusted)
from 2020 onwards”). Scale from -4 (“impossible”) to +4 (certain). The figure uses the full sample of answers. State
abbreviations are as follows - BW: Baden-Württemberg, BY: Bavaria, BE: Berlin, BB: Brandenburg, HB: Bremen, HH:
Hamburg, HE: Hesse, NI: Lower Saxony, MV: Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, NW: North Rhine-Westphalia, RP:
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Table 1: Survey details 
 No. of MPs / responses Response rate, % Survey date Last election date Parties in government coalition No. of AfD responses 
(wave 2)  Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 1 Wave 2 
Baden-Württemberg 138 / 77 139 / 78 55.80 56.12 
3/2012-
4/2012 
12/2014-
1/2015 
3/2011 3/2011 Green, SPD Green, SPD 0 
Bavaria 187 / 75 160 / 69 40.11 38.33 2011 
5/2015-
6/2015 
9/2008 9/2013 CSU, FDP CSU 0 
Berlin 149 / 30 149 / 38 20.13 25.33 
3/2012-
4/2012 
12/2014-
1/2015 
9/2011 9/2011 SPD, CDU SPD, CDU 0 
Brandenburg 88 / 18 88 / 18 20.45 20.45 2011 
2/2016-
4/2016 
9/2009 9/2014 SPD, Left SPD, Left 2 
Bremen 83 / 18 83 / 24 21.69 28.92 
3/2012-
4/2012 
2/2016-
4/2016 
5/2011 5/2015 SPD, Green SPD, Green 3 
Hamburg 124 / 39 121 / 27 31.45 22.31 
12/2011-
1/2012 
2/2016-
4/2016 
2/2011 2/2015 SPD SPD, Green 2 
Hesse 114 / 49 110 / 45 42.98 40.91 
12/2011-
1/2012 
2/2016-
4/2016 
1/2009 9/2013 CDU, FDP CDU, Green 0 
Lower Saxony  152 /54 137 / 53 35.53 39.42 2011 
12/2014-
1/2015 
1/2008 1/2013 CDU, FDP SPD, Green 0 
Mecklenburg Western Pomerania 71 / 17 71 / 23 23.94 32.39 
3/2012-
4/2012 
12/2014-
1/2015 
9/2011 9/2011 SPD, CDU SPD, CDU 0 
North Rhine- Westphalia 181 / 51 237 / 84 28.18 35.44 
12/2011-
1/2012 
12/2014-
1/2015 
5/2010 5/2012 SPD, Green SPD, Green 0 
Rhineland- Palatinate 101 / 48 107 / 52 47.52 48.60 
3/2012-
4/2012 
12/2014-
1/2015 
3/2011 3/2011 SPD, Green SPD, Green 0 
Saarland 51 / 20 51 / 15 39.22 29.41 2011 
5/2015-
6/2015 
8/2009 3/2012 
CDU, FDP, 
Green 
CDU, SPD 0 
Saxony 133 / 45 126 / 39 33.83 30.95 
12/2011-
1/2012 
2/2016-
4/2016 
8/2009 8/2014 CDU, FDP CDU, SPD 3 
Saxony-Anhalt 106 / 29 105 / 36 27.36 34.29 
12/2011-
1/2012 
12/2014-
1/2015 
3/2011 3/2011 CDU, SPD CDU, SPD 0 
Schleswig-Holstein 95 / 29 69 / 31 30.53 44.93 2011 
5/2015-
6/2015 
9/2009 5/2012 CDU, FDP 
SPD, Green, 
SSW 
0 
Thuringia 88 / 36 91 / 34 40.91 37.36 2011 
2/2016-
4/2016 
8/2009 9/2014 CDU, SPD Left, SPD, Green 4 
Overall 1,861 / 635 1,865 / 667 34.12 35.76        
Notes: Party names refer to Christian Democrats (CDU, conservative), Free Democrats (FDP, center-right liberal), Social Democratic Party (SPD, social-democratic), Green Party (Green, ecologist, centre-left), 
Left Party (Left, left-wing populist), South Schleswig voters union (SSW, representing the Danish minority), Alternative for Germany (AfD, right-wing populist). Number of AfD responses in survey wave 1 was 
zero (party did not exist).
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Changes in political power 
Stated expectations may differ due to discrepancies in expectations between incumbent gov-
ernment (“insider”) and opposition (“outsiders”). Insiders may be more optimistic than outsiders 
because they are overconfident and have a too favorable view on their own capability to steer the 
budget, following the behavioral literature on over-confidence (Moore and Healy 2008).3 An al-
ternative explanation is that insiders have better information than outsiders do.4 A low level of 
optimism in general has only a limited potential to explain the persistent pessimism despite fun-
damental improvement. Only to the extent that the share of opposition parliamentarians has in-
creased due to smaller margins of governmental majorities could this induce increasing pessimism 
related to the insider-outsider pattern counterbalancing the fundamental improvement. However, 
there is an additional outsider effect beyond the level effect: Outsiders may pay less attention to 
improving fundamentals. 
Table 1 shows that in several states the party composition of the incumbent government 
changed between the two surveys because of elections that took place in 13 states. There were 
eight changes in incumbent parties. Some were of minor nature, such as in Bavaria and Hamburg, 
where one party was added or dropped to the list of incumbent parties. In other cases, a coalition 
partner was substituted, such as in Hesse and Schleswig-Holstein (Green for FDP), Saarland (SPD 
for FDP and Greens), Saxony (SPD for FDP), and Thuringia (Left and Green for CDU). In Lower 
Saxony, the governing coalition changed completely. As a consequence of these changes of gov-
ernment composition between the two survey waves, some parliamentarians changed from being 
an opposition member to supporting the governing coalition (56 responding parliamentarians in 
our sample) or vice versa (60 responding parliamentarians in our sample), while others either 
remained in the opposition or in the government coalition throughout the survey period. We iden-
tify the effect of incumbency from these changes over time.  
Entry of right-populist party into parliaments 
The period between both waves saw a change in the political landscape in Germany. Tradi-
tional German parties like the center-right Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) and the center-left 
Social Democrats (SPD) lost seat shares in many parliaments. At the same time, an EU-skeptical 
 
                                                         
 
3 An equivalent explanation is that outsiders are „underconfident“ with respect to the capabilities of the incumbent 
politicians and have an unrealistically bad perception of their ability to steer the budget in compliance with the rules. 
4 The findings from Heinemann et al. (2016) rather point towards over-confidence of insiders than an information 
advantage. 
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and right-populist party, founded in 2013 (AfD, Alternative for Germany), obtained seats in sev-
eral state parliaments.5 Its initial focal point was the euro-area debt crisis with critical positions 
on euro rescue policies. In 2015, with the strong increase in the number of refugees arriving in 
Germany, it started to shift its focus towards anti-immigration, anti-Islam and other nationalistic 
positions. In 2014, the party was successful to reach vote shares above the German five-per-cent-
threshold and gained seats in the first three state parliaments (Saxony, Brandenburg and Thurin-
gia).6 Until 2016 it secured seats in a further six state parliaments. Thus, while none of the parlia-
ments had AfD members in our first survey wave, our second wave saw 5 out of 16 state parlia-
ments with members of this new party (see also Table 1).  
3.2 Fiscal environment 
The period covered through both survey waves experienced substantial variation in the eco-
nomic and fiscal environment. The first wave was conducted in the years 2011-2012 and, hence, 
a period that still felt the consequences of the financial crisis of 2008-2009 that had pushed Ger-
many into its record post-war recession with a GDP decline of -5.6 per cent in 2009 (AMECO 
Database) and severe consequences for tax revenues and government deficits. Moreover, the sur-
vey wave was concurrent with the height of the euro area debt crisis with its severe concerns 
about the future of the euro area.  
The economic and fiscal situation improved considerably in subsequent years. The German 
economy experienced a stable development with high growth rates (relative to its average perfor-
mance in the preceding decade), a strong continuous employment growth (from a total domestic 
employment of 41 million in 2010 to 43 million in 2014, AMECO database) and a marked reduc-
tion of unemployment from 7 to 5 per cent between 2010 and 2014 (Eurostat definition, AMECO 
database).  As a consequence, state finances considerably improved between both survey waves. 
Figure 2 demonstrates this improvement with regard to the financial balances of the German 
states. While in 2010 none of the 16 state budgets was in surplus, four years later nine states could 
present a surplus, and the remaining states moved their deficits closer to a balanced budget.  Con-
tributions to these improvements came from both the revenue side and the expenditure side. Re-
 
                                                         
 
5 Various factors explain the rise of right-populist parties in Western democracies (for a survey see Funke and Trebesch 
2017), among them backlash against globalization in general and immigration in particular. A deteriorating trust in the 
willingness and ability of  political institutions and established parties to properly address problems is a further general 
explanation closely correlated with the increasing vote shares of populist parties (Dustmann et al. 2017). 
6 The very first electoral success with a vote share above the five-per-cent-threshold was the election for the European 
Parliament in May 2014. The AfD entered the federal parliament, the Deutsche Bundestag, after the general election in 
2017. 
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garding the former, economic growth led to substantially higher state revenues, called fiscal ca-
pacity, which increased from an average across states of EUR 2,981 (USD 3,919) per capita in 
2010 to an average of EUR 3,714 (USD 4,883) in 2014.  This upward trend also materialized in 
individual states (see Figure A.1 in appendix).  
Figure 2: Financial balances of German states in % of GDP 
 
Figure 3: State debt per capita 
 
On the expenditure side, lower interest payments had a positive impact on financial balances 
(see Figure A.2 in the appendix). From 2010 to 2014, the average nominal interest rate on German 
government bonds decreased from 2.4 to 1.1 per cent (Deutsche Bundesbank), because of both 
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Notes: This figure presents the financial balance of the 16 German states in 2010 and 2014 in % of GDP. State abbreviations are
as follows - BW: Baden-Württemberg, BY: Bavaria, BE: Berlin, BB: Brandenburg, HB: Bremen, HH: Hamburg, HE: Hesse,
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Saarland, SN: Saxony, ST: Saxony-Anhalt, SH: Schleswig-Holstein, TH: Thuringia.
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the euro-crisis induced capital flight into the European safe havens and the expansive monetary 
policy of the ECB on the other hand.7 The improvement in financial balance shown in Figure 2 
occurred despite moderate increases in spending on public employment (see Figure A.3 in appen-
dix), which is the major spending item at state level. 
 While the budgetary situation improved in all states between 2010 and 2014, the legacy bur-
den was quite different across states. Figure 3 shows the debt level per capita. The situation dif-
fered both among city-states (Bremen HB, Hamburg HH, Berlin BE) and among all other states. 
Differences are not easily explained by differences between Western and Eastern Germany (e.g. 
the former GDR), as Saarland and Schleswig-Holstein in Western Germany have the highest lev-
els per capita, as well as Sachsen-Anhalt in the East. 
3.3 Unexpected event: refugee inflow 2015 
The favorable fiscal and economic developments described in the previous section provided 
for fundamentals that supported a more positive outlook in the second survey wave with regard 
to the German’ states’ debt brake compliance . However, the unexpected arrival of a large number 
of refugees in Germany in the course of 2015 constitutes an event that might plausibly have 
changed the medium- and long-run fiscal outlook and thus the compliance expectations of politi-
cians. The refugee migration originating in the Middle East unfolded while the second survey 
wave was ongoing. Because of the staggered execution of the survey, which was unrelated to the 
refugee migration (see Section 2.1), some parliamentarians were randomly questioned several 
months after the full extent of the refugee migration became apparent through a public statement 
of the German government (August 31, 2020) and were thus exposed to this information shock, 
while others responded to the survey several months before this date and were thus not exposed 
to the information shock (see Table 1 for the timing of the survey waves in individual states). 
Table A.2 in the appendix shows which states were surveyed early and which late. This survey 
feature provides a unique setting to identify its effect on fiscal rule compliance expectations. We 
analyze the extent to which the exogenous shock to the fiscal situation caused by a substantial 
and unexpected increase in inward migration affects compliance expectations, and whether they 
relate to incumbency.  
In the Summer of 2015, the number of persons seeking protection in Europe in general, and in 
Germany in particular, started to rise strongly (for details on the 2015 events see Kürschner Rauck 
 
                                                         
 
7 Falling interest rates affect the actual debt service only gradually with the replacement of maturing bonds. Still, there 
occurred a marked reduction in interest rate payments in this period. 
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and Kvasnicka 2018). On  August 31, the German head of the federal government, Angela Mer-
kel, publicly announced the willingness of the German government to accept a large number of 
refugees. Soon after, German borders were opened for refugees that had stranded in Hungary 
following their passage through the Balkan states. Thus, August 2015 marks the beginning of 
exceptionally high numbers of refugees received by German states. In this month alone more than 
100,000 refugees were registered with registration numbers crossing this threshold for the first 
time. The peak was reached in November 2015 with more than 200,000 entries (see Figure 4).8 
Immigration only slowed when the passage through the Balkan countries was closed in March 
2016. By then, almost one million refugees reached Germany in 2015. 
Figure 4: Refugee statistics Germany 2014 - 2016 
 
Notes: This figure displays the number of asylum applications in Germany. The “EASY registrations” indicate the actual registration 
of refugees who enter German territory independent of when the formal asylum application procedure (“first time applicants”) actually 
starts or has even resulted in a decision on the refugee status (“non-recognized refugees”/”recognized refugees”). EASY registrations 
not available before January 2015. Source: Replication of Chart 89 in German Council of Economic Experts (2016), based on publi-
cations by the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees and the Federal Ministry of the Interior, Building and Community. 
Among policy makers and public finance scholars these events led to a controversy on the 
possible fiscal consequences (Bahnsen et al. 2016; Bonin 2015; Sinn 2015), which ranged from 
strong pessimism to moderate optimism, largely depending on the authors‘ assumptions on cur-
rent qualifications, speed of skill and language acquisition, as well as general integration success 
of refugees. In late 2015, a reasonable estimate of additional fiscal spending for refugees in 2016 
was about half a percentage point of GDP (Independent Advisory Board of the Stability Council 
 
                                                         
 
8 The events were of high salience with arrival numbers of refugees reaching the main train station in Munich amounting 
to more than 17,500 persons on single days (Kürschner Rauck and Kvasnicka 2018). 
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2015). 
The induced fiscal burdens across states are largely exogenous from the viewpoint of individ-
ual states. While it is true that refugees initially entered Germany mostly through states in the 
south, the ultimate distribution is governed by a quota system (“Königsteiner Schlüssel”). Under 
this scheme, refugees are distributed based on states’ GDP (weight one third) and tax revenues 
(weight two thirds), thereby reflecting each individual state’s capacity to handle the cost of refu-
gee integration. It should be noted that eventually the federal government took over a large part 
of the costs associated with refugees through vertical transfers. However, at the time of the second 
survey both the magnitude and the vertical distribution of the burden was not clear. We thus con-
sider the surprising refugee inflow as an unexpected negative fiscal shock at the time of the sur-
vey.  
3.4 Variables and summary statistics 
We conclude with a presentation of the variables that we use in the empirical analysis. Table 
2 shows the variables grouped into four categories (i) politicians‘ personal characteristics (gender, 
age, part of governing coalition (GOVT) and member budget committee), (ii) party affiliation 
(AfD, CDU/CSU, FDP, Greens, SPD, Left, Others), (iii) fiscal variables, and (iv) dummies for 
time after refugee peak inflow (POST). 
Table 2: Summary statistics 
 No. of obs. Minimum Maximum Mean Standard Dev 
Comply 1,302 -4 4 0.970 2.540 
GOVT 1,302 0 1 0.530 0.500 
Female 1,302 0 1 0.240 0.420 
Age 1,302 26 78 55.090 10.430 
Budget Committee 1,302 0 2 0.350 0.610 
AFD member 1,302 0 1 0.010 0.100 
CDU/CSU member 1,302 0 1 0.420 0.490 
FDP member 1,302 0 1 0.060 0.230 
Greens member 1,302 0 1 0.110 0.310 
Left member 1,302 0 1 0.070 0.260 
SPD member 1,302 0 1 0.290 0.450 
Other party member 1,302 0 1 0.040 0.190 
Personnel exp. 1,302 891.740 2359.700 1410.580 342.810 
Balance 1,302 -2.960 0.810 -0.410 0.700 
Interest payment 1,302 4.300 84.790 26.990 16.530 
Change debt 1,302 -19.270 4.960 -1.870 5.610 
Log debt over GDP 1,302 1.760 4.260 3.230 0.630 
POST 1,302 0 1 0.140 0.350 
This table displays the summary statistics for the variables used in the empirical estimation. Detailed descriptions for the individual 
variables are displayed in Table A.1. 
Regarding the fiscal variables (iii), we use concurrent measures of debt over GDP (log) and 
the year-on-year percentage change of debt in a state. The budgetary situation is captured by the 
financial balance (revenues minus expenditures), as seen in Figure 2. To deal with the particularly 
high cyclical volatility of the financial balance we apply a moving average for this indicator. We 
take the weighted average of the balance (relative to GDP) for the year of survey participation 
and the two preceding years. We abstain from a forward-looking measure due to the high volatility 
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and difficult predictability of deficits. 
In addition, we consider the fiscal variables interest payments (Figure A.2) and spending on 
public sector employment (Figure A.3). As a proxy for the interest rate burden, we multiply the 
debt-GDP-level with the 10-year federal government bond yield for Germany in the year after the 
respondent took the survey.9 The construction of the indicator was chosen to have a faster reaction 
of the indicator to changes in market rates compared to the actual interest payments. The actual 
debt service adjusts only slowly in line with maturing bonds and their refinancing. Our more 
reactive indicator is well suited for the respondents’ long-term expectations since the fall of the 
actual interest rate is predictable if market interest rates have come down relative to the average 
interest coupons of the government bonds in circulation. Table 2 provides summary statistics for 
all variables. 
4 Empirical method 
We test the determinants of parliamentarians’ assessment of their own-state’s compliance with 
the fiscal rule. In particular, we run the following regression model: 
 
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑦𝑖𝑠𝑡 = 𝛼1𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2𝐹𝐼𝑆𝐶𝑠𝑡 + 𝛼3𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑇𝑖𝑡 ∙ 𝐹𝐼𝑆𝐶𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜙𝑖 + 𝜙𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑠𝑡 (1) 
 
where 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑦𝑖𝑠𝑡 is a categorical variable that contains the response to the question in survey 
wave 𝑡 of parliamentarian 𝑖, who has a mandate in the parliament of state 𝑠. As described in 
Section 2.2, the response is measured on a nine-point Likert scale from -4 (“impossible”) to +4 
(“certain”).  
A key variable of interest is the dummy variable 𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑇𝑖𝑡, which allows us to compare re-
sponses from parliamentarians belonging to the government coalition and the opposition. The 
dummy is equal to one if parliamentarian 𝑖 is a member of the governing coalition in survey wave 
𝑡 and zero otherwise. The effect is identified from those who switch in and out of the government 
coalition. 𝜙𝑖 and 𝜙𝑡 are parliamentarian and survey wave fixed effects. In some specifications, 
state-fixed effects replace one or two of the former. Depending on the set of fixed effects included 
in the model, the identification of key determinants stems from both cross-sectional variation 
among individuals (if only survey wave fixed effects are included) or variation within parliamen-
tarians over time. 𝐹𝐼𝑆𝐶𝑠𝑡 is a vector of time-varying state-level variables that characterize the 
 
                                                         
 
9 Bond yields for bonds of German states differ only to a very small extent due to the explicit and implicit guarantees 
of the federal level for state debt. Hence, yields for federal bonds are a reasonable proxy for interest costs of all German 
jurisdictions.  
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sustainability of public finances in state 𝑠 in survey wave 𝑡. We include the indicators relating to 
state government debt, financial balance of the state budget, and in further analyses consider in-
terest payments, and expenditure on public sector employment, as described in Sections 3.2 and 
3.4.  
As alternative fiscal variable, we analyze the plausibly exogenous fiscal shock induced by the 
refugee crisis in 2015. We replace the variable 𝐹𝐼𝑆𝐶𝑠𝑡 with a dummy variable 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇 that is equal 
to one if the respondent took the second survey after August 2015, that is, after the surge in refu-
gee migration became apparent. For a list of states (and the number of answers obtained) who fall 
into the category, see Table A.2 in the appendix. As described in Section 3.3, the sudden increase 
in refugee migration was largely unexpected. It can thus be viewed as an event that exogenously 
shifted parliamentarians’ expectations. We consider the interaction between 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇 and 𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑇𝑖𝑡 
to see whether members of governing parties respond differently to the refugee inflow. 
𝑋𝑖𝑡 is a vector of fixed and time-varying parliamentarian characteristics comprising the gender 
of the parliamentarian (a dummy variable equal to one if the parliamentarian is female and zero 
otherwise), the age of the parliamentarian, and a dummy variable that is equal to one if the par-
liamentarian is a member of the budget committee in her or his state parliament. 
Potential concerns about proper identification arise from sample selection, as responding to 
the survey was voluntary and not all parliamentarians responded. To assess whether this intro-
duces a bias to our estimates, we run a unit non-response analysis using the full sample of all state 
parliamentarians in both survey waves. Details of this analysis are presented in appendix B. We 
regress a dummy variable that is equal to one if a parliamentarian responded to the survey on 
several parliamentarian characteristics in a probit model. While we find that some of these signif-
icantly affect the response probability, we also observe that these effects are constant over time 
and, importantly, not conditional on parliamentarians’ expectations with regard to the compliance 
of their state with the debt brake. Hence, our results are unlikely to be driven by selection bias: 
we can account for selection based on parliamentarian characteristics by controlling for time-
varying parliamentarian attributes and including parliamentarian fixed effects. 
During the survey period 2011-2016 there were 13 parliamentary elections on the state level 
of which eight resulted in a change of the composition of the governing coalition. Changes in 
government participation can arguably be considered as exogenous events from the parliamentar-
ian’s perspective in the sense that an individual parliamentarian’s future expectations of fiscal 
rule compliance are unlikely to affect the probability of his party being part of a governing coali-
tion. There are several reasons for this. First, both election of the individual parliamentarian and 
the election outcome as well as government formation as a whole are relatively uncertain and not 
easily influenced by an individual parliamentarian’s opinion. Second, the timing of the survey 
ensured that parliamentarians received the survey in the middle of their term when re-election 
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considerations are not very relevant. Finally, fiscal rule compliance did not play a major role in 
any of the state-level election campaigns. 
When we consider ideological biases, we augment regression model (1) by dummy variables 
that indicate the party affiliation of the respondent. We chose the market-liberal FDP as reference 
case whose voters are particularly supportive for the debt brake (Hayo and Neumeier, 2016).  
We run linear models throughout the main analysis because of their simplicity and transpar-
ence and because the estimated coefficients are easier to interpret (Angrist and Pischke 2008). In 
robustness checks, we also run ordered logit regressions for model (1). 
We like to note that the first wave of our parliamentarian survey was used by Heinemann et 
al. (2016) to analyze the cross-section of compliance expectations. Using two survey waves in the 
present study to examine parliamentarians’ expectations in a panel structure has several important 
advantages. First, we identify incumbency effects from within-parliamentarian variation driven 
by exogenous changes in the coalition of incumbent government parties. This allows us to account 
for parliamentarian specific factors via fixed effects. Second, variation in fiscal fundamentals are 
exploited across both states and time. Finally, the second wave used in the present paper com-
prises an exogenous information shock with respect to the fiscal environment to which some par-
liamentarians were randomly exposed.  
5 Empirical results 
We begin with a general examination of the incumbency effect. Taking the full sample that 
includes both waves, column (1) of Table 3 presents the outcome when individual characteristics 
are considered, as well as survey and state fixed effects, but time-varying fiscal variables are left 
out. We observe a strong and highly significant effect for incumbents, as measured by the dummy 
GOVT. Members of governing parties are more optimistic regarding compliance, by close to 1.4 
points on the scale that ranges from -4 to +4. If we use respondent fixed effects (column 2), the 
incumbency effect becomes even larger by about 0.5. 
Returning to column (1), females are more pessimistic, but membership in the budget com-
mittee does not seem to matter in a systematic way. Regarding political ideology, members of the 
populist AfD are substantially more pessimistic (almost two points) relative to the benchmark of 
the market liberal Free Democrats. This effect comes on top of the opposition effect (so far the 
AfD has never been part of a government coalition) since we control for the different perspective 
of government and opposition parliamentarians. 
Next, we analyze in more detail the incumbency effect. As a first step, we split the sample 
along the two waves and observe a strong difference in the incumbency effect over time. In wave 
1 (column 3), the incumbency effect is positive (0.715) and highly significant, but in the order of 
one third of the size in wave 2 (column 4), and about half of what we observed in the full sample. 
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This finding suggests that the incumbency effect has become stronger over time.  
Table 3: Regression results, incumbency bias 
 
Full sample Wave 1 Wave 2 
Comparison groups (see Table 4) 
 (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) 
 
   
Govt. in 
both waves 
vs. switch 
to opp. in 
wave 2 
Opp. in 
both waves 
vs. switch 
to govt. in 
wave 2 
Opp. in 
both waves 
vs. switch 
to opp. in 
wave 2 
Govt. in 
both waves 
vs. switch 
to govt. in 
wave 2 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
GOVT 1.390*** 1.878*** 0.715*** 2.121*** 2.864*** 2.433*** 1.346* 0.935 
 (0.140) (0.477) (0.204) (0.182) (0.687) (0.765) (0.701) (0.763) 
Female -0.384**  -0.434** -0.377*     
 (0.151)  (0.220) (0.198)     
AFD member -1.923***   -1.362**     
 (0.435)   (0.530)     
CDU/CSU member 0.111  -0.096 0.110     
 (0.281)  (0.383) (0.392)     
Greens member 0.495  0.138 0.199     
 (0.327)  (0.460) (0.453)     
Left member 0.709*  0.983** 0.197     
 (0.376)  (0.490) (0.544)     
SPD member 0.626  0.416 0.504     
 (0.412)  (0.406) (0.405)     
Other party member 0.741**  0.551 0.401     
 (0.294)  (0.661) (0.544)     
Age 0.006 0.068 0.012 -0.002 0.357* 0.002 0.381** 0.005 
 (0.006) (0.102) (0.009) (0.007) (0.184) (0.054) (0.175) (0.054) 
Budget Committee -0.072 0.046 -0.049 -0.158 -0.127 0.318 0.049 0.107 
 (0.097) (0.194) (0.214) (0.111) (0.199) (0.338) (0.317) (0.222) 
State FE Y N Y Y N N N N 
Respondent FE N Y N N Y Y Y Y 
Survey wave FE Y Y N N Y Y Y Y 
Observations 1,302 1,302 635 667 484 385 402 467 
Adjusted R2 0.321 0.438 0.236 0.446 0.285 0.535 0.440 0.354 
This table presents the regression results of an OLS model using specification (1). The dependent variable is the respondent’s expec-
tation about the compliance of his or her state. A detailed variable description is displayed in Table A.1. Regressions (1) and (2) 
include the full sample. Regression (3) and (4) include only responses in survey wave 1 and 2, respectively. Regression (5) compares 
parliamentarians that retain power to those that lose it. Regression (6) compares parliamentarians that gain power to those that never 
had power. Regression (7) compares parliamentarians that lose power to those that never had it. Regression (8) compares parliamen-
tarians that retain power to those that gain it. Regression (1), (3) and (4) includes state fixed effects while regressions (2) and (5) to 
(8) include respondent fixed effects. All regressions with the exception of (3) and (4) include survey wave fixed effects. Standard 
errors (adjusted for clustering at respondent level) are presented in parentheses. Stars behind coefficients indicate the significance 
level, * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. 
We elaborate on this claim by further disentangling the treatment and control groups in our sam-
ple. Effectively, there are four sets of comparisons from which we identify the incumbency effect 
in our analysis, summarized in Table 4: (i) among parliamentarians that were part of the govern-
ment coalition in wave 1, compare those whose party lost power before wave 2 to those who 
retained it; (ii) among parliamentarians that were in the opposition in wave 1, compare those that 
joined the government coalition in wave 2 to those that did not; (iii) among parliamentarians that 
were in the opposition in wave 2, compare those that were part of the government coalition in 
wave 1 to those that were not; (iv) among parliamentarians that were in the government coalition 
in wave 2, compare those that were part of the government coalition in wave 1 to those that were 
not. Columns (1) and (2) of Table 3 present specifications that estimate the average incumbency 
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effect across these four groups, while columns (5)-(8) present the estimated effect for each sub-
group. 
Table 4: Comparisons in empirical analysis 
  Comparison (i)  Comparison (ii)  Comparison (iii)  Comparison (iv) 
  1st group 2nd group  1st group 2nd group  1st group 2nd group  1st group 2nd group 
Wave 1 
 
Government Government  Opposition Opposition  Government Opposition  Government Opposition 
Wave 2 
 
Government Opposition  Government Opposition  Opposition Opposition  Government Government 
This table displays the comparison groups used in the empirical analysis. 
In columns (5) and (6) the two groups share the same position in wave 1 (both in opposition 
or both in government), but differ in wave 2, while in columns (7) and (8) the common position 
is in wave 2, but not in wave 1. Finding differences in results across these two groups of regres-
sions speaks therefore to the incumbency effect over time. 
In column (5), we compare politicians who stayed in power over the two survey dates with 
those that were incumbents in the first wave, but not any more in the second. The former are much 
more optimistic than the latter by more than 2.8 points. Similarly, column (6) indicates that poli-
ticians that gained power are much more optimistic than those who never held power. By contrast, 
column (7) shows that losing power has a strong negative effect, because those who were not in 
power in either wave are more pessimistic by about 1.3 points, but the effect is only marginally 
significant. The difference between those who stay in power to those who gain power (column 8) 
is insignificant.  
The results of Table 3 point to a strong incumbency effect that has risen over time. A plausible 
explanation is that the time to the date when the German debt brake becomes binding (2020) is 
much closer in the second wave than in the first one. The politicians who are in power during 
wave 2 have a reasonable chance of being in power in 2020 and to shape the fiscal decisions to 
compliance or non-compliance with the fiscal rule. By contrast, in 2011/12 the showdown in 2020 
was several election cycles away. The political blame game between government and opposition 
can be expected to be more forceful in the second wave.  
It is tempting to extrapolate this finding and expect a monotonically increasing incumbency 
effect in time. This could be the case for the reason we just provided. At the same time, however, 
the scope to make policy adjustment to reach a target becomes smaller, and the goal may be 
considered unreachable at some point. For example, a state with a very high budget deficit in 2019 
is unlikely to meet a balanced budget in 2020. Reality therefore is likely to constrain expectations 
of politicians eventually, regardless of their role in government or opposition. 
Next, we analyze the incumbency effect and its interaction with fiscal variables, which are 
considered by deviations from the mean. In Table 5 we include fiscal variables individually and 
in interaction with GOVT. We first note the positive and highly significant incumbency effect that 
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is found in all specifications, which in terms of size is comparable to the estimates for the full 
sample or wave 2 sample in Table 3. Turning to the fiscal variables, we find that they individually 
rarely matter on average as can be seen from the non-significant coefficient estimates for the fiscal 
variables in column (1) of Table 5.  
Table 5: Regression results, interaction with fiscal fundamentals 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
GOVT 1.919*** 2.074*** 2.206*** 1.797*** 2.326*** 1.888*** 
 (0.503) (0.488) (0.514) (0.469) (0.499) (0.501) 
GOVT × Balance (demeaned)  1.005***     
  (0.344)     
Balance (demeaned) 0.391 -0.425     
 (0.384) (0.340)     
GOVT × Change debt   -0.116**    
   (0.057)    
Change Debt (demeaned) -0.072  0.013    
 (0.090)  (0.048)    
GOVT × Log debt over GDP (demeaned)    0.360   
    (1.001)   
Log debt over GDP (demeaned) 0.832   1.059   
 (1.298)   (1.451)   
GOVT × Personnel exp. (demeaned)     0.005***  
     (0.002)  
Personnel exp. (demeaned) -0.003    -0.008***  
 (0.004)    (0.003)  
GOVT × Interest payment (demeaned)      -0.073* 
      (0.042) 
Interest payment (demeaned) -0.004     0.051 
 (0.059)     (0.038) 
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Respondent FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Survey wave FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 1,302 1,302 1,302 1,302 1,302 1,302 
Adjusted R2 0.436 0.451 0.444 0.437 0.452 0.441 
This table presents the regression results of an OLS model using specification (1). The dependent variable is the respondent’s expec-
tation about the compliance of his or her state. A detailed variable description is displayed in Table A.1. All regressions include 
controls for the respondent’s age and membership in the parliamentary budget committee. Standard errors (adjusted for clustering at 
respondent level) are presented in parentheses. Stars behind coefficients indicate the significance level, * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. 
There is, however, substantial heterogeneity in the effect of fiscal variables with respect to 
incumbency. When interacted with the GOVT variable, some fiscal variables are significant, such 
as a better budgetary situation leads to a more optimistic view by incumbent politicians (column 
2) and higher percentage increases in debt have a negative effect (column 3). Furthermore, the 
expectations of members of governing parties are not negatively affected by higher capita ex-
penditures on state employment, as can be seen from the non-significant sum of the coefficient 
for this fiscal variable and the coefficient for its interaction with the government dummy (column 
5). A one percentage point increase in per capita expenditures leads to 0.005 increase on the an-
swer scale, a relatively small effect. The interaction with interest payments is negative and only 
marginally significant (column 6). Opposition parliamentarians appear to be largely indifferent to 
fiscal variables, except with regard to per capita expenditures on state employment (personnel) 
above the mean, which lead to significantly lower compliance expectations (column 5) among 
22 
 
opposition members. Budget balance (column 1), change in debt (column 2), debt over GDP (col-
umn 3), and interest payments (column 5) show no significant effect on expectations of opposition 
parliamentarians. 
Table 6: Regression results, information shock through refugee migration 
 (1) (2) (3) 
POST -0.925*** -1.493*** -2.169*** 
 (0.260) (0.429) (0.540) 
GOVT × POST   1.453* 
   (0.788) 
GOVT 1.376*** 1.787*** 1.606*** 
 (0.140) (0.488) (0.514) 
Female -0.398***   
 (0.151)   
AFD member -1.511***   
 (0.446)   
CDU/CSU member 0.180   
 (0.281)   
Greens member 0.540*   
 (0.327)   
Left member 0.809**   
 (0.372)   
SPD member 0.814***   
 (0.294)   
Other party member 0.654   
 (0.412)   
Age 0.004 0.090 0.114 
 (0.006) (0.134) (0.145) 
Budget Committee -0.086 0.005 0.006 
 (0.097) (0.192) (0.191) 
State FE Y N N 
Respondent FE N Y Y 
Survey wave FE Y Y Y 
Observations 1,302 1,302 1,302 
Adjusted R2 0.327 0.462 0.466 
This table presents the regression results of an OLS model using specification (1). The dependent variable is the respondent’s expec-
tation about the compliance of his or her state. A detailed variable description is displayed in Table A.1. Standard errors (adjusted for 
clustering at respondent level) are presented in parentheses. Stars behind coefficients indicate the significance level, * 10%, ** 5%, 
*** 1%. 
We now turn to a largely exogenous event that influenced fiscal balances of states negatively, 
namely the inflow of refugees into Germany in 2015. In Table 6 we consider the full specification 
of regression (1), which includes now the dummy POST (for FISC) to reflect the influence of the 
refugee inflow. Column (1) confirms the findings on GOVT from Table 5 (column 1): The incum-
bency effect is of same significance and very similar magnitude (almost 1.4 points). In the absence 
of interaction between the two dummies, the estimated coefficient of POST is negative. Hence, 
the sudden increase in inward migration appears to be a negative shock on the compliance expec-
tations in German states. Parliamentarians that were aware of this shock (i.e. questioned after 
August 2015, indicated by POST = 1) were substantially more pessimistic with regard to the future 
debt brake compliance of their state. These two results are robust to including respondent fixed 
effects in column (2), and become rather bigger in absolute size, which is confirming what we 
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found in Table 3. Column (3), however, indicates that the negative effect of POST is concentrated 
among opposition parliamentarians and thus again largely driven by incumbency. Incumbents are 
more optimistic to contain possibly adverse consequences of refugee immigration on fiscal sus-
tainability. The effect is only marginally significant though. 
We check the robustness of our main findings to the specification choice by replicating the 
main results of our analysis in an ordered logit estimation that accounts for the categorical nature 
of the dependent variable. Results are presented in the appendix (see Table A.3 and Table A.4) 
and are qualitatively similar. In these specifications, the dummy GOVT is always highly signifi-
cant and positive, female politicians are somewhat and AfD politicians are strongly more pessi-
mistic. The impact of fiscal fundamentals and the sudden increase in refugee migration is again 
heterogeneous with respect to incumbency of the respondent. The interaction between GOVT and 
POST is now even significant at the 5% level. 
6 Discussion and Conclusions 
Our analysis has identified a strong incumbency effect: Members of the governing coalition 
are much more optimistic than opposition politicians in their expectations regarding compliance 
with a fiscal rule that becomes binding in the medium future. The incumbency effect comes on 
top of any partisan effect relating to party or ideology.  
A second result of our analysis is that the size of the incumbency effect increases over the two 
waves of our survey. This dynamic is particularly interesting. The closer distance to the debt 
brake’s full effectiveness should reduce uncertainty for parliamentarians on both the government 
and the opposition benches. This in itself should lead to a convergence of expectations eventually. 
The contrary effect must therefore result from the political blame game. Close to full effective-
ness, compliance expectations include a judgment on the capabilities and performance of politi-
cians currently in power. A strong asymmetric view on the latter is a usual pattern of any political 
competition. We show that this ‘blame game’ effect outweighs the effect of falling economic and 
fiscal uncertainty. 
In answer to the question raised in the introduction, we conclude that the stable optimism 
displayed by incumbents - independent from the partisan imprint - is conducive to pursuing a 
long-term goal. Changes of government power between different parties do not cause turbulence 
in achieving a long-term goal such as compliance with the German debt brake.  
While our analysis does not allow us to directly test whether the incumbent politicians are too 
optimistic, or the opposition members are too pessimistic, we can use the benefit of hindsight to 
observe that by end of 2019 (that is shortly before the Corona crisis hit) all states in Germany 
were well on target for complying with the debt brake in the following year (15 out of 16 states 
had positive financial balances in 2019). In hindsight, the expectations of opposition members in 
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our surveys thus appear to be too pessimistic, rather than incumbents being too optimistic.   
In addition, we have examined the role of the fiscal environment and shocks to it in particular. 
We observe and thereby confirm another variant of the incumbent effect: A negative information 
shock with regard to the fiscal environment – as it is well identified with the unexpected entry of 
refugees in 2015 – leads to more pessimistic expectations. The effect appears to be driven by 
members of the opposition but not by members of the incumbent government.  
In our study, independent partisan effects that are orthogonal to the opposition-government 
pattern do only play a minor role. The notable exception, with insights that go beyond the German 
case, concerns the specific perception of politicians from new anti-establishment parties, in our 
case the German AfD. From the emerging literature on the determinants of populist votes, it is 
known that these movements benefit from their voters’ particularly gloomy assessment of a coun-
try’s current and future socio-economic developments in the age of globalization (Becker et al. 
2017; Funke et al. 2016; Rodrik 2018). Results from our second survey wave reveal that this 
pessimism and distrust translates into a low reputation of fiscal institutions as populist parliamen-
tarians are particularly pessimistic about rule compliance, even compared to other opposition pol-
iticians (for regional parliaments see André, Bradbury, et al. 2015; for national parliaments see 
André, Depauw, et al. 2015) 
We like to point out the contribution of our results in the context of the debate on fiscal rules. 
Our analysis sheds light on the possibility that expectation effects of one specific fiscal rule can 
strongly differ between (groups of) individual policy makers. There is a large and growing liter-
ature that assesses the effectiveness of fiscal rules on fiscal outcomes. A common approach is to 
estimate in cross-section or panel models the effect of fiscal rules on outcomes in jurisdictions 
(local, regional or national). This kind of research design cannot reveal how a fiscal rule affects 
expectations of individual policy makers within a jurisdiction. Our approach fills this gap and 
explains the heterogeneity of individual compliance expectations both in the cross-section and 
over time. 
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Appendix A: Additional tables and figures 
Table A.1: Variable description 
Variable   Description 
Comply Answer to survey question 
GOVT Dummy equal to one if respondent is member of a party in the governing coalition 
Female Dummy equal to one if the respondent is female 
Age Age of the respondent 
Budget Committee Dummy equal to one if the respondent is member of the parliamentary budget committee 
AFD member Dummy equal to one if the respondent is member of the AfD 
CDU/CSU member Dummy equal to one if the respondent is member of the CDU or CSU 
FDP member Dummy equal to one if the respondent is member of the FDP 
Greens member Dummy equal to one if the respondent is member of the Greens 
Left member Dummy equal to one if the respondent is member of the left party 
SPD member Dummy equal to one if the respondent is member of the SPD 
Other party member Dummy equal to one if the respondent is member of another party (except AfD, CDU, FDP, 
Greens, left party, SPD) 
Personnel exp. Per capita expenditure for public employees in the current year 
Balance Weighted avg. fiscal balance in the respondent’s state in the last three years (weights: t-1 50%, t-2 
30%, t-3 20%) 
Interest payment Interest payments to non-public sector divided by population in the respondent’s state in the current 
year 
Change debt % change in the debt level in the respondent’s state from last year to current year 
Log debt over GDP Logarithm of public debt per GDP in the respondent’s state in the current year 
POST Dummy equal to one if questionnaire was returned in 2016 
 
Figure A.1: Individual state fiscal capacity, 2010-2014 (per capita EUR, 2010 constant 
prices)
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State tax revenue VAT redistribution Equalization contributions/grant Supplementary federal grants
This figure displays the individual components of government revenue for each of the 16 German states in euros per capita for
2010 and 2014 (EUR, in constant 2010 prices). State tax revenue is the sum of a state's shares of income and corporation tax
revenue as well as revenue from state taxes. VAT redistribution is the state's share of VAT revenue. Supplementary federal
grants are grants from the federal government. Equalization contributions and grants are transfer payments between the states.
Source: German Ministry of Finance. State abbreviations are as follows - BW: Baden-Württemberg, BY: Bavaria, BE: Berlin,
BB: Brandenburg, HB: Bremen, HH: Hamburg, HE: Hesse, NI: Lower Saxony, MV: Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, NW:
North Rhine-Westphalia, RP: Rhineland-Palatinate, SL: Saarland, SN: Saxony, ST: Saxony-Anhalt, SH: Schleswig-Holstein,
TH: Thuringia.
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Figure A.2: Interest payments, 2010-2014 (per capita EUR, 2010 constant prices 
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Municipality State
Notes: This figures presents the intereste payments for the 16 German states and their municipalities in 2010 and 2014 to the
non-public sector per capita (EUR, in 2010 constant prices). The nominal amounts have been inflation adjusted (values in
constant 2010 prices). Source: German Statistical Office (Destatis). State abbreviations are as follows - BW: Baden-
Württemberg, BY: Bavaria, BE: Berlin, BB: Brandenburg, HB: Bremen, HH: Hamburg, HE: Hesse, NI: Lower Saxony, MV:
Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, NW: North Rhine-Westphalia, RP: Rhineland-Palatinate, SL: Saarland, SN: Saxony, ST:
Saxony-Anhalt, SH: Schleswig-Holstein, TH: Thuringia.
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Figure A.3: State expenditure on public sector employment, 2010-2014 (per capita EUR, 
2010 constant prices) 
Table A.2: Number of responses before and after the substantial increase in migration to 
Germany in August 2015 
 First survey wave Second survey wave 
  Before August 31, 2020 After August 31, 2020 
State (POST = 0) (POST = 0) (POST = 1) 
Baden-Württemberg 77 78 - 
Bavaria 75 69 - 
Berlin 30 38 - 
Brandenburg 18 - 18 
Bremen 18 - 24 
Hamburg 39 - 27 
Hesse 49 - 45 
Mecklenburg Western Pomerania 17 23 - 
Lower Saxony 54 54 - 
North Rhine- Westphalia 51 84 - 
Rhineland- Palatinate 48 52 - 
Saarland 20 15 - 
Saxony 45 - 39 
Saxony-Anhalt 29 36 - 
Schleswig-Holstein 29 31 - 
Thuringia 36 - 34 
Total 635 480 187 
This table reports the number of respondents before and after the extent of the refugee migration into Germany became apparent 
through a public statement of the German government in August 2015.  
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Notes: This figures presents the per capita expenditure (EUR, in 2010 constant prices) for state personel of the 16 German states
in 2010 and 2014. Source: German Statistical Office (Destatis). State abbreviations are as follows - BW: Baden-Württemberg,
BY: Bavaria, BE: Berlin, BB: Brandenburg, HB: Bremen, HH: Hamburg, HE: Hesse, NI: Lower Saxony, MV: Mecklenburg-
Western Pomerania, NW: North Rhine-Westphalia, RP: Rhineland-Palatinate, SL: Saarland, SN: Saxony, ST: Saxony-Anhalt,
SH: Schleswig-Holstein, TH: Thuringia.
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Table A.3: Regression results, interaction with fiscal fundamentals (Ordered logit) 
 Full sample Wave 1 Wave 2 Full sample 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
GOVT 1.181*** 4.186*** 0.484*** 2.170*** 4.964*** 5.990*** 4.124*** 5.436*** 4.364*** 
 (0.123) (1.212) (0.162) (0.199) (1.339) (1.506) (1.389) (1.350) (1.509) 
GOVT × Balance (demeaned)     2.737***   0.013**  
     (0.906)   (0.005)  
Balance (demeaned)     -1.772**   -0.025***  
     (0.885)   (0.009)  
GOVT × Change debt      -0.506***    
      (0.193)    
Change Debt (demeaned)      -0.023    
      (0.129)    
GOVT × Log debt over GDP (demeaned)       0.179   
       (3.564)   
Log debt over GDP (demeaned)       3.003   
       (6.088)   
GOVT × Personnel exp. (demeaned)        0.013**  
        (0.005)  
Personnel exp. (demeaned)        -0.025***  
        (0.009)  
GOVT × Interest payment (demeaned)         -0.177 
         (0.125) 
Interest payment (demeaned)         0.197* 
         (0.101) 
Female -0.303**  -0.407** -0.288      
 (0.127)  (0.178) (0.195)      
AFD member -1.935***   -1.584***      
 (0.423)   (0.540)      
CDU/CSU member 0.125  -0.050 0.124      
 (0.233)  (0.320) (0.359)      
Greens member 0.302  0.107 -0.171      
 (0.270)  (0.367) (0.423)      
Left member 0.526*  0.548 0.141      
 (0.317)  (0.413) (0.523)      
SPD member 0.481*  0.267 0.195      
 (0.248)  (0.339) (0.384)      
Other party member 0.519  0.739 0.286      
 (0.373)  (0.698) (0.536)      
Age 0.005  0.009 -0.001 0.918** 0.980** 0.781** 0.499 0.852** 
 (0.005) (0.350) (0.007) (0.007) (0.363) (0.385) (0.369) (0.350) (0.350) 
Budget Committee -0.090 0.051 -0.031 -0.207* 0.084 -0.457 0.048 -0.095 -0.148 
 (0.083) (0.492) (0.178) (0.110) (0.526) (0.555) (0.487) (0.483) (0.518) 
State FE Y N Y Y N N N N N 
Respondent FE N Y N N Y Y Y Y Y 
Survey wave FE Y Y N N Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 1,302 1,302 635 667 1,302 1,302 1,302 1,302 1,302 
This table presents the regression results of an Ordered logit model using specification (1). The dependent variable is the respondent’s 
expectation about the compliance of his or her state. A detailed variable description is displayed in Table A.1. Standard errors (adjusted 
for clustering at respondent level) are presented in parentheses. Stars behind coefficients indicate the significance level, * 10%, ** 
5%, *** 1%. 
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Table A.4: Regression results, information shock through refugee migration (Ordered 
logit) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
POST -0.786*** -3.987*** -6.112*** 
 (0.228) (1.355) (1.572) 
GOVT × POST   5.676** 
   (2.649) 
GOVT 1.171*** 3.990*** 3.197** 
 (0.122) (1.362) (1.413) 
Female -0.325**   
 (0.127)   
AFD member -1.602***   
 (0.434)   
CDU/CSU member 0.181   
 (0.237)   
Greens member 0.338   
 (0.271)   
Left member 0.574*   
 (0.320)   
SPD member 0.550**   
 (0.252)   
Other party member 0.534   
 (0.380)   
Age 0.003 1.099*** 1.290*** 
 (0.005) (0.399) (0.388) 
Budget Committee -0.107 -0.053 -0.055 
 (0.083) (0.493) (0.479) 
State FE Y N N 
Respondent FE N Y Y 
Survey wave FE Y Y Y 
Observations 1,302 1,302 1,302 
This table presents the regression results of an Ordered logit model using specification (1). The dependent variable is the respondent’s 
expectation about the compliance of his or her state. A detailed variable description is displayed in Table A.1. Standard errors (adjusted 
for clustering at respondent level) are presented in parentheses. Stars behind coefficients indicate the significance level, * 10%, ** 
5%, *** 1%. 
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Appendix B: Unit non-response analysis 
In order to assess whether the selection of certain types of parliamentarians into the sample of 
survey respondents affects our results, we conduct a unit non-response analysis in which we use 
the full sample of state parliamentarians in Germany during both survey waves. In a probit re-
gression model, we relate a dummy variable that is equal to one if a parliamentarian has responded 
to several parliamentarian characteristics. The results of this analysis are presented in Table B.1. 
Columns (1) and (2) present the results for waves 1 and 2, respectively. In both waves, members 
of the government coalition were less likely to respond while older parliamentarians and those 
who were members of the budget committee were more likely to respond. This implies that it is 
important to control for these variables as we do in the main regression analysis. Importantly, the 
effect of these time-varying parliamentarian characteristics on the response probability does not 
significantly change from wave 1 to wave 2. Hence, the incumbency effect, which is identified 
from changes within individual parliamentarians, is unlikely to be biased due to selection on these 
characteristics. In addition to time-varying characteristics, parliamentarian-fixed characteristics 
such as party membership, gender and economics education also affect the response probability. 
These characteristics are fully captured by the parliamentarian fixed effects in our main regression 
model. 
A remaining concern is that parliamentarians’ response probability changes over time when 
they (through decisions on the party level) switch between opposition and supporting the govern-
ment coalition. In particular, such changes in the probability might be conditional on the stated 
compliance expectation of the parliamentarian in the first survey wave. For example, if parlia-
mentarians that switch from opposition to government between the two waves are less likely to 
respond in wave 2 if they were more pessimistic in wave 1, we would overestimate the incum-
bency effect, as identified from comparing parliamentarians that switch from opposition to gov-
ernment to those that stay in opposition, because the potentially pessimistic government coalition 
members in wave 2 would have been endogenously selected out of the sample. 
In columns (3) to (6), we assess this potential bias by rerunning the probit model on the sample 
of parliamentarians that have responded in wave 1, such that we know their compliance expecta-
tion, and stayed in parliament throughout wave 1 and 2. The dependent variable then is a dummy 
that indicates whether parliamentarians responded in wave 1 and 2 (or responded in wave 2, con-
ditional on having responded in wave 1). The explanatory variables now include dummy variables 
that indicate whether a parliamentarian stayed in the government coalition or opposition or 
switched between these groups. These dummy variables are also interacted with the parliamen-
tarian’s stated compliance expectation in wave 1 to estimate possible unit non-response with re-
spect to incumbency conditional on the compliance expectation in wave 1. In each of the columns 
33 
 
(3)-(6), we exclude one of the four possible parliamentarian groups (staying in government, stay-
ing in opposition, switching from opposition to government, switching from government to op-
position) which serves as a baseline in the regression to compare the other groups to. We find that 
parliamentarians which are government coalition (opposition) members in both waves are signif-
icantly less (more) likely to respond, which is consistent with our results on the individual survey 
waves. Similarly, parliamentarians that switch to opposition are more likely to respond in wave 
2. However, we estimate no significant coefficient for any of the interaction terms between the 
incumbency changes and the compliance expectation in wave 1. Hence, the bias described above 
is unlikely to drive our results. 
To conclude, the unit non-response analysis shows that the response probability is significantly 
affected by parliamentarian characteristics. However, these effects are constant over time and not 
conditional on parliamentarians’ expectations with regard to the compliance of their state with 
the debt brake. Hence, we can account for this selection by controlling for time-varying parlia-
mentarian characteristics and including parliamentarian fixed effects. 
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Table B.1: Unit non-response analysis 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 All MPs in office dur-
ing survey  
All MPs in office during survey wave 1 & 2 and 
responding in wave 1 
 wave 1 wave 2  
GOVT -0.222*** -0.141*     
 (0.067) (0.074)     
Age 0.005 0.005*     
 (0.003) (0.003)     
Budget Committee 0.331*** 0.222***     
 (0.082) (0.044)     
Compliance exp. (wave 1)   0.113 0.023 -0.019 0.138* 
   (0.079) (0.075) (0.057) (0.071) 
GOVT_TO_OPP     0.204 0.031 0.575* 
    (0.402) (0.298) (0.320) 
GOVT_TO_OPP × Comply (wave 1)    0.090 0.132 -0.024 
    (0.109) (0.098) (0.107) 
OPP_TO_GOVT    -0.204  -0.173 0.371 
   (0.402)  (0.321) (0.323) 
OPP_TO_GOVT × Comply (wave 1)   -0.090  0.042 -0.114 
   (0.109)  (0.093) (0.103) 
STAY_IN_OPP    -0.031 0.173  0.544** 
   (0.298) (0.321)  (0.251) 
STAY_IN_OPP × Comply (wave 1)   -0.132 -0.042  -0.156 
   (0.098) (0.093)  (0.095) 
STAY_IN_GOVT   -0.575* -0.371 -0.544**  
   (0.320) (0.323) (0.251)  
STAY_IN_GOVT × Comply (wave 1)   0.024 0.114 0.156  
   (0.107) (0.103) (0.095)  
Female -0.275*** -0.351*** -0.478** -0.478** -0.478** -0.478** 
 (0.069) (0.069) (0.213) (0.213) (0.213) (0.213) 
Economics education 0.173** 0.151* 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 
 (0.087) (0.082) (0.212) (0.212) (0.212) (0.212) 
AFD member  -0.414     
  (0.256)     
CDU/CSU member 0.236* -0.151 -0.037 -0.037 -0.037 -0.037 
 (0.128) (0.166) (0.432) (0.432) (0.432) (0.432) 
Greens member 0.007 -0.319* -0.381 -0.381 -0.381 -0.381 
 (0.148) (0.184) (0.626) (0.626) (0.626) (0.626) 
Left member -0.297* -0.320* 0.110 0.110 0.110 0.110 
 (0.159) (0.187) (0.580) (0.580) (0.580) (0.580) 
SPD member 0.008 -0.143 -0.068 -0.068 -0.068 -0.068 
 (0.132) (0.175) (0.501) (0.501) (0.501) (0.501) 
Other party member -0.115 -0.234 -0.068 -0.068 -0.068 -0.068 
 (0.217) (0.214) (0.657) (0.657) (0.657) (0.657) 
Observations 1,861 1,861 232 232 232 232 
This table presents the regression results of a probit model using specification. The dependent variable a dummy variable that is equal 
to one if the parliamentarian answered the survey in wave 1 and wave 2 in columns (1) and (2), respectively, and a dummy equal to 1 
if the parliamentarian answered the survey in wave 2 in columns (3)-(6). GOVT_TO_OPP (OPP_TO_GOVT) is a dummy variable 
that is equal to one if the parliamentarian changed from the government coalition (opposition) to the opposition (government coalition) 
from wave 1 to wave 2. STAY_IN_OPP (STAY_IN_GOVT) is a dummy variable that is equal to one if the parliamentarian was in 
the opposition (government coalition) in both wave 1 and 2. Economics education is a dummy that is equal to one if the parliamentarian 
as a business or economics degree from a tertiary education institution. Definitions for the other explanatory variables can be found 
in Table A.1. Standard errors (adjusted for clustering at respondent level) are presented in parentheses. Stars behind coefficients 
indicate the significance level, * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. 
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